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Come now and let us reason together (Isaiah 1.18) 
And he shall wIpe away the lears from their eyes; and [here shall nUL be any 
more death. or sorrow, nor crying, neither there be any more pain, for the 
f'ufmer [hmgs have passed away (Revelations 21 4) 
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF INTERPRETATION 
What should the courrs do when they are called upon to interpret impor-
tant documents, such as statutes and constitutions? Should they interpret 
them literally - using the words of the document alone, even when a 
literal interpretation leads to unjust results or arbitrary consequences? Or 
should interpretation necessarily involve protecting and promoting cerrain 
background political and moral values - values that are cherished in 
Ghanaian or African society' We shall call the problem raised here the 
problem oj Interpretation. 
Two dominant theories of interpretation in Ghanaian law will be dis-
cussed here. First, the Uteral Interpretation Theory (LIT) argues that docu-
ments should be interpreted literally The courts must not be concerned 
with the consequences of their interprerarJon because it is not rhe busj· 
ness of the couns to determine whether a law is just or unjust. As long as 
the law is enacted by the legislature, it must be obeyed. The second 
theory is Value-Based Interpretation (VRIT). It argues that moral and politi-
cal considerations are central to the (ask of interpretation. This is because 
such values indicate the kind of society that we wish to live in and these 
etre part of our aspirations as a SOCiety. A theory of interpretation that 
ignores these values is necessarily hollow and unacceptetble. 
How do we resolve the problem oj interpretation? First. it will be argued 
here that the problem oj interpretation can be resolved only by anchoring it 
on a solid theory oj legitimacy. Three different accounts of legitimacy will 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
be distinguished. These are legal legitimacy, ethical legitimaLy and histori-
cal legitimacy. It wIll be shown lhat the problem oj interpretation can be 
resolved by basing interpretation on historical legitimacy which is the only 
solid theory oj legitimacy. It will also be argued that any theory of legiti-
macy which is not based on historical legitimacy. is a thin theory oj legiti-
macy. It will be further demonstrated that LIT, which is based on legal 
legitimacy alone, is a thin theory oj legitimacy. We shall argue further that 
legal legitimacy commits the legalisticJaliacy. 
Secondly. we shall argue that the LIT that is propounded in Ghanaian 
courts is strongly inrluenced by the dourine of parliamentary sovereignty 
espoused in English constitutional theory. However, we shall show that, 
contrary to the Ghanaian position. the legitimacy of interpretation in 
English law is nOl based on legal legitimaLy alone. Dicey - the classical 
exponent of English constitutional theory - argues that in spite of the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. the legitimacy of parliamentary 
enactments is based on historical legitimacy because invariably parliament 
will enact laws that conform [Q the values or English SOCiety." 
Thirdly, we shall argue that because of the nature or the typical African 
polity, anemprs (0 introduce English constirutional doctrines into African 
politics invariably become a tyrant's charter - the legalisation of tyranny. 
Pinally, we shall try to show why interpretation ought to be based on 
VBIT. VBIT will be constructed on a historical legitimacy that is accepted in 
Chanaian and African society. It will be argued that Ghanaians and Arri-
cans aspire (0 live in a society based on the rule of law wirhin a liberal 
democratic system. lIistorical legitimacy reqUires that legal interpretation 
should protect and enhance values such as liberty,jairness and integrity. A 
political system based on these values is the only legitimate polirical 
system in which Ghanaians and Africans wish to live. It is also the only 
political system in which they can expect to advance economically and 
hold their own within the world community of persons. 
1.2 What is legitimacy? 
Beetham' argues that there are three different types of legitimacy. These 
are legal legitimacy, ethical legitimacy and historical legitimacy However. 
Beerham argues rhat it is historical legitimacy that is userul to the social 
scientist. We also shall conclude that it is historical legitimacy that can help 
us to resolve the problem oj interpretation. 
But before we do that. we have [0 explain the different types of legiti-
macy. Legal legitimacy is legitimacy seen from the lawyer's point of view. 
Legal legitimacy is thererore legal validity. For a lawyer, an exercise of 
authOrity is legitimate if the power was legally acquired, if the actor had 
authority to act and if he has acted within the prescribed limits. Beerham, 
however, argues that legal legitimacy is deficient because sometimes 
2 Diuy llJCJO 










































LEGlTIMACY AND INTERPRETATION IN GHANAIAN LAW 
questions about legitimacy are not about legal validity alone. Sometimes 
they are questions about whether the Jaw can be justified according to 
moral or political principles. 
Ethical legitimaLY is the philosopher's account of legilimacy. For the 
philosopher, an exercise of power is legitlmate if it conforms to universal 
moral or political principles. Beetham argues thac this account of legiti-
macy, while useful, cannot help us to explain legitimacy in historical socie-
ties. This is because people in historical societies may nOl necessarily accept 
a philosopher's supposedly universal moral and political principJes.
4 
It is historical legitimacy that can explain legitimacy in particular hisLOri~ 
cal societies. Historical legitimacy combines legal legitimacy and ethical 
legitimacy, but contextualises these principles to a particular historical 
SOCiety. For an act to be historically legitimate, it must be valid in terms of 
the laws of that society, it must be justified in terms of the values of that 
society and there must be demonstrable consent by members of that 
society to the act under consideraLion 
Why is legitimacy important in society? Beetham argues correctly that 
legitimacy is important because human beings are moral persons and 
what is illegitimate offends our moral senses. Legitimacy is the normative 
aspect of power relations and it provides the grounds for subordinates LO 
obey (heir superiors. 
Legitimate power is important LO any political system because it allows 
the system to be orderly, stable and effective. The political system is 
orderly because subordinates obey their superiors. It is stable because 
there is a bedrock of support for the system and this allows it to withstand 
shocks. It is effective because superiors are able to achieve their purposes 
because of the quality of performance which they can secure from their 
subordinates. 
1.3 The legalistic fallacy 
i [istorical legitimacy, as we have argued. conrains three elements rhar are 
necessary for any proper account of legitimacy. These are legal validity, 
ethical legitimacy and demonstrable consent of subordinates to the ac~ 
tlons of superiors. We shall call an account of legitimacy that recognises 
these three elements as essential constituents of any account of legitimacy 
a solid theory oj legitimacy Any account of legitimacy that does not recog-
nise anyone of the elements of this trinity is a fallacious argument. Such a 
fallacious account of legitimacy will be characterised as a thin theory oj 
legitimacy More importantly. we shall label an account of legltlmacy that 
relies exclusively on legal legitimacy as suffering from lega/isticja/lacy 
2 LEGITIMACY AND INTERPRETATION IN GHANAIAN LAW 
How have Ghanaian courts handled the problem of interpretation? What 











































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
that exist in the Ghanaian polity? Are they based on solid theories of 
legitimacy or are they based on thin theories of legitimacy? Is the legalistic 
fallacy a serious problem in Ghanaian law? 
Three cases, CFAO v Zaced', Assibey v Ayisf and Armah v Naawu7 will be 
analysed here (0 explain the response of past Ghanaian courts to the prob-
lem oj interpretation. 
2.1 Historical background to these cases 
Between 1966 and 198 [, there were several overthrows of governmems 
through military coups in Ghana. When the military took over. they re-
structured the superior courts. The restructuring process interfered with 
the handling of cases that were before the courts before an overthrow 
LOok place. These problems resulted in the interesting decisions that show 
the different responses of [he courts LO the problem of interpretation, 
2.2 CFAO V Zacca 
In J 966, the civilian governmem of the CPP was overthrown by a coup, 
As part of the restructuring of the superior COLIrt, the Supreme COLIrt was 
abolished. What was left were the lIigh Courts and the Court of Appeal. 
The Court of Appeal was divided into two parts. the Ordinary Bench of the 
Appeal Court and the Full Bench of the Appeal Court. 
An appeal against a decision of the High Court went to the Ordinary 
Bench of [he Appeal Court. There could be no appeal against a decision of 
the Appeal Court. A person aggrieved by a decision of the Ordinary Bench 
of the Appeal Court could, however, seek a review before the Full Bench of 
the Court of Appeal. In order to seek a review of a decision of the Ordinary 
Bench of the Appeal Court. one had to seek leave from the Ordinary Bench. 
The plaintiff-applicant in CFAO v Zacca lost his case in the High Court. 
He appealed against the decision LO the Appeal Court, which dismissed the 
appeal on 15 August 1969. Exactly one week after the Appeal Coun's 
decision, and as part of the return to constitutional rule, a new constitu-
tion came inro force that restructured the prevailing court system The 
Superior Courts were restructured to include a Supreme Court. The appli-
cant then applied to the new Appeal Court for review of the decision of 
the former Appeal Court. This was refused on 20 June 1970. 
On 21 August 1971 the applicant brought a motion seeking an exten-
sion of time to appeal to the Supreme Court against the decision of t 5 
August 1969. He did this according to the rules of the Supreme Coun. 
According to those rules. a person could apply for extension of time 
against a final decision of a court within three months of the decision. If 
after one month, the court had not laken a decision on his application, the 
appellant could move the Supreme Court to determine the application. 
5 [1'J72JI CI.I{ %6397. 











































LEGITIMACY AND INTERPRETATION IN GHANAIAN LAW 
Section 13( I) and (2) of the Transitional Provisions or the 1969 ConstI-
tution slaled that: 
(1) Subject to the provisions of [his section, legal proceedings pending Imme-
diately before any Court, including cIvil proceeding by or against the Gov-
ernmenl, shall not be affected by the coming Into force of this Con-
stitution and rnay be continued accordingly 
(2) Where at the commencement of this Constitution there IS any matter for 
review before a Full bench of the Court of Appeal in being immediately be-
fore any such commencement, that matter [or review shall be deemed (Q 
be an appeal before the Supreme Court as established under the provi-
sions of this ConstitutIon 
But ror [he abolition of the former strucTure, the applicant would have had 
the right to seek leave of the Ordinary Court for review of its decision 
before the cull Bench of the Court of AppeaL WiIh the abolishing of the 
old structure. the question before the courts in CFAG v Zacca was whether 
there was a "matter pending" before the full Court of Appeal. which could 
be converted into an appeal before the Supreme Court. 
The applicant argued that since he had Ihe right to seek leave for a re-
view of the decision before Full Bench of the Court oj' Appeal, there was a 
"matter pending" before the Full Bench of the Court oj' Appeal, which 
could be converted into an appeal before the Supreme Courl. This was in 
spite of the fact that he had not physically tiled the application seeking 
leave to review the decision before the Full f)ench was abolished. 
The respondent argued that there was no "maIter pending" before the 
Full Bench because the plaintiff had nOI fried the application for review at 
the time the Constitution came into force_ According to the respondent, 
the interpretation to be given to section 13( I) and (2) oj' the Transitional 
Provisions of the Constitution was (hat it was only when a person had 
already nled his application in courr that Ihe right to seek review could be 
converted into an appeal to the Supreme Court. 
It is important to understand the full force of the applicant's argument 
A rigid application or the respondent's argument could lead to great 
hardship and injustice ["or the applicant. It could also result in serious 
incoherence for the legal system. Let us suppose that two cases, X and Y, 
were heard on I August 1969. X's judgment was given on J 5 AugusI 
1969. while y's judgment was read a day before the new Constitution 
came into force. The parties in X would have the lime to file an applica-
tion for review before the cull Bench of the Courr of Appeal before the 
new Constitution came into effect, whilst the parties in Y would have no 
such opportunity. The effect will be that the application for review in X 
could be converted into an appeal before Ihe Supreme Courl. lIowever, 
the application in Y will not be heard by the Supreme Courr, because, 
through no fault of Y, there could noI have been the opporrunity to file an 
application for review before the full Bench of the Courr of Appeal. 
In dealing with these questions, Azu Crabbe JSC provides insights into 
one atmude towards interpretation in Ghanaian law Azu Crabbe JSC 
argues that whilst he has sympathy J'or a person in y's situation, there is 
nothing (he courts can do to assist him. Where the meaning of a statute is 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
a literal interpretation leads to injusLice, the aggrieved party cannot look 
to the courts for redress. He states that: 
The fundamental rule of interpretatIon. to whIch all others are subordinate, is 
thoU a statUle is lO be expounded 'according to the intent of them that made it' 
If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous no more 
IS necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense, 
the words themselves in such case is declaring the intention of the legislature. 
The object of all imerpretation of statute is to determine what intention is to be 
conveyed. either expressly or impl1edly by the language used, so far as is nec-
essJry for determining whether the particular case or facts presemed to the 
ullerpreter falls with in it.' If there is one construction for statutes and other 
documents. it is that you must not imply anything in them that is inconsistent 
with words expressingly used" 
It IS said that the application of the maxim in this case will work injustice or 
hardship But an answer to that argument is that if the precise language of an 
enactment is clear and unambiguous it IS the duty of the courts lO enforce u, 
though the results may be unjust. arburary or inconvenIent It IS not the duty of 
the courts to make the law reasonable but to expound iL as it stands_" 
Since Azu Crabbe JSC argues that statutes must be interpreted literally. it 
is clear that he is committed to LIT. 
Sowah JA. however. takes a different position. Stating his pOSition on 
the case he argues that: 
As already observed, the jUdgment of which extension of time is being sought 
was delivered a week before the coming into force of the Constitution There is 
no room for argument that the applicant"company would have had a right of 
appeal If thaL Judgment had been delivered on or after 22 August 1969, and 
the only question which would have aflsen would be w~ether thIS court would 
be disposed [0 exercise its discretion In extending time. ,,-' 
Before embarl'<..ing upon a detailed discussion, it is necessary to preface 
it by saying that it is the manifest intention of the Constitution to pro~ 
vide within defined limits a further forum of appeal." In considering 
these articles pertaining to appeal and right of appeal to the Supreme 
Court, this court ought to lean towards such interpretation as will convey 
the intention into efFect, unless of course there are express provisions to 
the contrary. Judicial notice ought to be taken that shortly before the 
coming into force of the Constitution several cases were heard by the 
Court of Appeal created under the Courts Decree,'~ judgments in some 
were delivered before 22 August 1969. while others were heard after the 
eFFective dates. The order of the delivery did not depend upon the dates 
or order uron which they were heard, but on the fortiu(Ou5 circum-
stances leading to some being delivered by 22 August 1969 while the 
remaining ones were only delivered after this date:'~ 
H 1197211 (il.l-{ 174 
q 1197211 GLR375 
10 [hid 
J J See arts 105 Jnt! lOb 01' the COllstirulioll. 
J?- 1966 (NI.CD 84) 










































LEGITIMACY AND INTERPRETATION IN GHANAIAN LAW 
The respondent draws a date-line and maIntains thar [here is no fight of appeal 
from judgment delivered by [he Court of Appeal Jrnmedlately before the date-
line except where the applicant had flied a notice of review. Thus, jf two ap-
peals were heard on the same date, say 1 August 1969, and one had jUdgment 
deltvered on 21 August, 1969 while the second Judgment was read on 22 
August the later jUdgment could be appealed against while the lOSing party in 
the earller case lost his right of appeal. It seems Justice demands parity of 
treatment, Though, perhaps noL very apt one cannot but help recall the ancient 
maxim 'Equality is Equity': it seems desirable to place such construcllon on the 
relevant articles which would meet the test of equality of treatment or at least 
of opportunity. I; 
Note that Sowah JA would decide the case on the "Integrity" of the 
constitution, equality and justice. These concepts can be either forma! or 
substantive moral and political values. His position is thus very different 
from that of Azu Crabbe JSc. Since he argues that interpretation should 
conform to either formal or substantive moral and political values. we 
shall call hiS position the value based Interpretation theory (VBIT). LIT 
and VBIT can be found in the other two cases we shall discuss in this 
paper. 
2.3 Assibey III V Ayisi 
[n January 1972, the constitutional government was again overthrown 
The new military government again re-organised the courts and this 
resulted in the same kinds of problems that came up in CFAO v Zaeea. 
According to aniele I 05( I )(c) of the 1969 Constitution (the Constitution 
that was overthrown by the military) an appeal from a decision of the 
Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court required leave of the Court of 
Appeal. Leave was granted only when the Court of Appeal felt that a 
substantial issue of law or a question of public importance was to be 
decided. 
In Assibey III v AYlsi the applicant had previously had his appeal beFore 
the Appeal Court dismissed. On 28 July 1972. the applicant filed if motion 
with the Court of Appeal seeking leave to appeal against their decision 
before the Supreme Court. On t 3 September 1972. and before that appeal 
could be heard. rhe Supreme Coun was abolished. Its appellate jurisdic-
tion was taken over by the Full Bench of the Court of Appeal by the Courts 
(Amendment) Decree 1972 NRCD 101. By section I of NRCD (1972). the 
Full Bench of the Court of Appeal had Jurisdiction to deal with only cases 
that had been duly filed at the Supreme Court before the decree came into 
force Due to the fact that the applicant had not had the reqUisite time, his 
case was not before the Supreme Court before it was abolished. At (hat 
time, he was seeking leave of the Court of Appeal to appeal to the Su-
preme Coun. 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
It could be argued that on a literal reading of the decree, NRCD (1972) 
dealt with only cases where an appeal had been filed before the Supreme 
Coun before it was abolished. Il made no provision for cases where the 
applicant was seeking leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Like the 
application in CFAO v Zacca, the applicant argued that injustice would be 
clone to him if he were not given a chance to appeal to the Full Bench of 
the Court of Appeal. To achieve a just result, he argued that his case ought 
to be considered as a case filed before the Supreme Court before the 
coming into force of the Decree. 
Azu Crabbe JA gave judgment In the case. He again rejected the argu-
ment of the plaintiff Basing his deciSion on a full-blown LIT, he stated that: 
It is plam (hat at [he commencement of this Decree there was no appeal in this 
case pending before the Supreme Court, and therefore the full Bench is not 
clothed with jurisdiction to enlertain any such appeal coming before it by leave 
The Decree did not provide for cases falling under anicle 105 clause (1)( c) of 
the Constitution or seclion 3 (1)( d ) of the Couns An, 1971 and unprovided 
for lhey mUSl remain The coun cannot rake upon Itself to supply omissions in 
an enactment, for thiS would be 'a naked usurpation of the legislative function 
under the thm disguise of interpretation" Magar and St Mellons R DC v Newpurt 
Corporation [/952] SV 189, per Lord Simmonds at p 191 HL Consequently, 
we hold that the application is misconceived and it is accordingly refused. I" 
Note again that Azu Crabbe JA claimed to be looking only to the words of 
the statute. As long as the statute did not provide for the situation that the 
plaintiff faced, the courts could not intervene to assist him, even though 
their non-intervention would lead to injustice. It was not the duty of the 
courts to enaCl statutes and they should not use interpretation as a back-
door roule to changing the law. 
2.4 Armah and others v Naawu 
The courts faced a similar situation in Armah 1I Naawu Again the different 
attitudes to interpretation are evident in the two important judgments of 
the case. Amissah JA's Judgment was based on VBIT, while Archer JA 
rejected the applicant'S argument, basing his decision on LIT. 
According to Amissah JA the facts of the case were as follows: 
The application before us is one 'for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court 
<J.gainst the decision of the Appeal (ourt' It is common knowledge that the Su-
preme (ourt referred to has been abolished and that its demise took effect as 
long ago as 13 September 1972, The application now comes for consideration 
on the basis that it IS an application for leave to apply for review by the full 
bench of this court of a decision of its ordinary bench And the question is: is 
this conversion permissible7't 
Explaining the inherent incoherence of LIT from a moral point of view, 
Amissah JA argues that 
In sum, the whole matter bOils down to thiS question: procedural rules apart, 
would a person who had an adverse judgment given by the ordinary bench of 











































LEGITIMACY AND INTERPRETATION IN GHANAIAN LAW 
the Coun of Appeal against him immediately before the abolition of the Su-
preme Court be entitled to apply to (he ordinary bench for leave to Invoke 
the Jurisdlctlon of the full bench? To that question my answer is firmly in the 
affirmative If as I view It a person who had filed no application before the 
substitution of [he one tribunal by the other could. acting within the Lime al-
lowed by the procedural rules, apply for leave, I see no reason why his brOlher 
In (he same position should be prejudiced merely because he happened (Q have 
flied his application for leave to be granted by this coun La proceed LO (he 
higher tribunal before It was replaced The solu(!on in (har case lies nO( in a 
dismissal or the application but in an amendmenr.
17 
Amissah JA's arguments are based on the integrity of the legal system and 
the need to ensure fairness within it. Archer JA, on the other hand, based 
his dissenting judgment on I.IT. His position is particularly interesting 
because iL is based on an extremely hard LIT. Archer JA states the consti-
tutional position of the courts as foHows: "firstly, It is not the role of a 
court of law to legislate". According to Archer JA, the interpretation of the 
statute is clear and consequently it has to be interpreted literally. "The 
language of paragraph 3(2)(d) is so clear and unambiguous that no aids to 
St,Hutory interpretation or construction are called for". I, 
Archer JA concludes by looking aL the consequences of LIT in the light of 
his theory about the constitutional position of the courts and moreJl evils 
such eJS hardship eJnd injustice. 
It has been argued that injuSlice and hardShip would be caused. I agree but 
when the legislature through an enactment has clearly conferred Jurisdicrion 
(wnh express limitations) on a court of law, I do not think it IS open w the court 
w enhance and expand Its jurisdiction in order w avoid injustice and hardship 
When the first Republican Constitution came inw force in I gbO. all appeals 
pending before the Privy Council abated No doubt. the appellants In these 
cases were tremendously aggrieved. It was the Wish and Intenllon of the legisla-
ture that these appeals should abate. In the present case, NRCD 101 IS com-
pletely Silent on applications for leave 10 appeal w the former Supreme Court 
Is It opens to us t"or reasons for injustices and hardship advocated by an appli-
cant, that the court should drive a coach and horses Into NRCD 101 and confer 
upon Itself JUrisdiction to hear the ilppliciltlon? With the deference to my 
learned brothers, I am lTlcltned to think that the course they have chosen In 
granting the application smacks of .ludicial subverSion of the Proclamation of 
r 972 and I must categorically disassociate myself from rhis 'voyage of discov-
ery'. It seems w me thal when cerrain ma{(ers have not been taken care of in 
enactment, lhe defects or omission shp,uld be brought to the notice ot" the body 
wlrh the appropriate legislative power 
2,5 LIT. legitimacy and the legalistic fallacy 
How do we resolve the problem of interpretation? What is legitimate 
public action? From the accounts given by Azu Crabbe JSC in CFAO v 
latta and Assibey If! v Ayisi, and Archer JA in Armuh v Naawll, it is obVIOUS 
LhaL for them legal validity alone is the basis of legitimate public action To 
! 7 [! 975] 2 eLl-{ 2 I ') 
18 r I 1)751 2 (,iJ{ 2 I S. 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
them, as long as the law has been enacted by the legislature, it is legiti· 
mate and citizens have to obey it. There is no role For moral and political 
values in the determination of legitimate public action. 
It is obvious that this account of legitimacy is based on a thin theory of 
legitimacy and It suffers from the legalistic fallacy. It ignores the values of the 
Ghanaian society and citizens' views about the laws that have been enacted. 
2.6 Parliamentary sovereignty and LIT 
As a consequence of the issues discussed above, a number of important 
questions come to the Fore: why should anyone propound LIT as a theory 
of interpretation? What is the basis of LIT? What is the basis of Am 
Crabbe JSC and Archer JA's literal interpretation theory? It is not difficult 
to notice that LIT is based on that very English constitutional doctrine 
called "parliamentary sovereignty". Azu Crabbe JSC and Archer JA quote 
liberally from English texts on statutory interpretation. English legal theo· 
rists and From English constitutional theory. ThereFore it is clear that 
parliamentary sovereignty provides the key to understanding LIT. 
What is parliamentary sovereignty and how is it related to LIT? What 
account of legitimacy is the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty based 
on? Is it based on a thin theory of legitimaGy and does it suFFer From the 
legalistic fallacy? For answers to these questions, we must examine the 
views of the classical exponent of English constitutional theory - Dicey. 
3 DICEY'S THEORY OF LEGITIMACY 
How does Dicey answer questions about interpretation? What is his account 
of legitimacy? Is he committed to LIT and the lega/isticfallacy? 
I shall argue here that Dicey provides a solid theory of legitimacy in 
which all the elements of historical legitimacy are present. Dicey argues 
that the English constitutional system is legitimate because it is based on a 
liberal democracy in which the electorate is the ultimate sovereign. The 
electorate chooses the legislature, which is ultimately accountable to the 
electorate. Although the legislature is sovereign and can enact any laws 
that it wishes and the courts are duty bound to enForce all laws passed by 
the legislature, the legislature will not enact laws that are contrary to the 
values of English people. If they do so. they risk being dismissed in the 
next elections. They also risk a rebellion From the electorate. Conse-
quently, the legitimacy of the courts' role in interpretation is not due 
solely [0 the legal validity of the laws passed. Interpretation rests on 
historicallegitima('y because parliament will nO( act contrary to the values 
of English SOCiety. Interpretation is therefore not based on the legalistic 
fallacy. English subjects must obey the law enacted by the legislature 
because the law ultimately reflects values of English society. 
3.1 The laws of the Constitution 
Lets us now prf'sent Dicey's view in detail. According to Dicey, the English 
Constitution is made up of two elements. These are the laws of (he Consti-










































LEGITIMACY AND INTERPRETATION IN GHANAIAN LAW 
which are not enforced by the couns. The laws of the Constitution are 
based on the doctrines of parliamentary sovereignty, Ihe rule of law and 
dependence of [he conventions of the ConslilUtion on (he laws of the 
Constitution. Parliamentary sovereignty has a positive and negative side. 
On the positive side, it means that the courts will enforce any laws en-
aCled by parliament On the negative side, it requires that the courts 
should ignore any rules that are contrary to laws enacted by parliament'" 
Dicey, however, distinguishes two sovereigns within the English consti-
tutional arrangement. These are the legal sovereign, which is parliarnem, 
and the political sovereign, which IS the electorate, Although from the 
legal point of view parliamem is the most important institUlion, from (he 
perspective of politics the electorate is (he ullirnale sovereign. ,,"rom the 
position or the laws or the Constitution, the courts know nOlhing about the 
"will" of the electorale and will ignore that "will" unless it is expressed in 
an ACI of parliament. The political reality is Ihat, ultimately, the courts will 
enrorce the will or the people because a legislature thal enacts laws con-
[rary to [he wishes of the people will be dismissed in the next eleClion. 
This is because, although parliament is sovereign in the English constitu-
tional system, parliamenlary sovereignly operates within a representalive 
democratic arrangemenL 
Speakmg roughly, the permanent wishes of the representative portion of par-
liament can hardly run differ from the wishes of the English people, or at any 
rate of the electors; what the majority of the House of Commons command, the 
majority of the English people usually desire.?1 
3,2 The values of the Constitution 
J)ue to the representative nature of English politics, J)icey argues Ihat, in 
spite of parliamentary sovereignty, the legislature will not enact laws 
contrary to the values of the English society. Whal are these values? These 
are the love of liberty and Justice, the democratic spirit and the love of the 
rule oj law over the rule oj men, Generally these values prevent Ihe devel-
opment of tyranny and the lise of arbitrary power. The English Constitu-
tion expresses English society values because it has grown out of lhe 
hlsIOry of the English people and IS a reflection of their culture. Any 
attempt to interfere with an English person's constitutional right to liberty 
will reqUire a wholesale change in English culture. It is in this Contexl that 
he stales his views on LIT. 
A Bill which has passed into a sta£ute JfTlfTlediately becomes sUbJecr to JudICIal 
interpretation, and the EnglIsh Bench has always refused, In principal at least, 
to interpret an Act 0/ Parliament otherwise than by reference to the words oj the 
enactment. An English judge will take no more notice of the resolutions of either 
House, of anythIng whICh may have passed m debate (a matter of which offi-
cially he has no cognizance), even of the changes which a Bill may undergone 
between the moment of us introduction to Parliament and of its receiving the 
Royal assent. !:' 
20 DIcey I (jbO 39 '10 
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LAW, DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
Clearly. the LIT that Dicey expresses here is not supposed to give the 
courts a blank cheque to the legislature to enact any laws it wishes. It is 
meant co assist the courts to prevent parliament from interfering with the 
liberties of English people. 
3.3 The values of English politics 
How are 'he values of English society captured in the everyday politics of 
Britain? Dicey argues that the values of English society can be found in the 
workings of the conventions of the Constitution.·'~ The objectives of the 
conventions are that, ultimately, parliament and the Cabinet give effect LO 
the values and aspirations of the true political sovereign of the English 
constitutional system ~ the eleccorate. According to him. [he conventions 
are obeyed because the laws support the conventions of the Constitution, 
and a breach of an imporrant convention will almost inevitably lead to a 
breach of the law. 
4 LEGITIMACY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE POST-COLONIAL 
AFRICAN STATE 
Will a theory of legitimacy that is based on legal validity alone be suitable 
for the Ghanaian polity? Does the Ghanaian polity exhibit the love of 
liberty and justice. the democratic spirit and legality that Dicey considered 
central to the working of a political system based on legislative supremacy? 
To be able to answer these questions it is important for us to examine 
the African state hiscorically. There has been a mistaken impression. 
especially among lawyers. that the African state can be understood ahis-
torically. This explains why lawyers are quick to apply legal doC(rines 
developed in societies very different from our own. without recognising 
that these doctrines make sense only within the peculiar historical cir-
cumstances of those societies. It is therefore central to understand as 
Chabal has argued that the post-colonial Arrican state developed from 
specific historical circumstances. Consequently. any attempt to compre-
hend it, explain it, and chart a direction for it requires a deep appreciation 
of this history.:·1 
To understand the African state. we must recognise that it was a forci-
ble coming together of different political communities whose politics and 
culture exhibited different accounts of legitimacy and accountability. The 
system that kept these communities together was colonial rule. However. 
for most Africans, the colonial state was illegitimate and unacceptable. 
The African state therefore developed out of the colonial state and in-
herited many of its characteristic weaknesses. The colonial state derived 
from conquest and was thus essentially based on force. Colonial rule. 
however, was not old or deep enough for its methods and values to 
21 Ikey· IlJ60· ·tIH·4IY 










































LEGITIMACY AND INTERPRETATION IN GHANAIAN LAW 
change and for it to become legitimate [0 most Africans. Legitimacy to the 
colonial state was at best superficial. A challenge to any aspect of colonial 
rule was invariably taken as a challenge to the colonial state and the 
colonist responded with force or the threat of force. The colonial state 
defined the rules of politicS within its territory and the rules could be 
changed arbitrarily to suit the circumstances of the colonists. 
The colonial state was also centralised. This was because its survival 
depended on its ability to control politics and dissent within the statc. 
Until the last days of colonialism, representation within the colonial state 
was rare. The colonial state was also coercive because it was essentially a 
relationship between the conqueror and the conquered It was thus diffi-
cult for the colonists to depend on the co·opcration of Africans for the 
survival of their power. The principles and programmes of the colonial 
state were sanctioned by a political power that was external to the African 
communities that made up {he colonial state 
In comparison, the modern African state has developed many of the 
characteristics of the colonial state. Its size. structure and organisation 
have been determined by the operational requirements of colonialism. 
After independence, however, the new states had aSJ,Jirations that could 
not be realised through the structures of the colonial state. There was thus 
a dissonance between the nature of the post~colonial state and its re· 
sources and aspirations. 
Unfortunately the post~colonial African state did not inherit one of the 
strengths of the colonial state - its structure of political accountability. 
Within the internal arrangement of the colonial state, the state was the 
most important factor. But the colonial government was limited by the 
fact that it was accountable to the external imperial government, which 
had the capaCity to control its excesses The post-colonial African state 
does not have this limitation. It has the power to control the resources of 
the state, unhindered. There is no recognisable body politic that defines 
the obligations of the state within the modern African political system and 
there are no operatiOnal principles of accountability. Until such principles 
are developed, the African state remains unrestrained. 
Colonial rule was short and its principles of accountability and legiti-
macy were unacceptable to Africans. Consequently, the colonial state did 
not develop organically from African civil society. It was thus not an· 
chored solidly to African communities. The post-colonial African state has 
also inherited this major weakness. It is not rooted deeply in many Afri-
can communities and it lacks legitimacy in the eyes of many people. As a 
result, it is weak in its foundations and it is structurally deficient to carry 
on the duties of a modern state. 
Due to its deficiencies, there has becn a struggle by those who control 
the State to assert its authority in the politics of Africa. Without any prin~ 
clples of political accountability, the controllers of the state have tried to 
use any methods - moral or immoral - to survive. This has led to a bitter 
and incessant struggle in which the state has sought to control all the 
important sectors of the polity. And in this struggle all methods, espeCially 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
4.1 Dicey's theory of legislative sovereignty and the African 
state 
We have discussed the nature of the African state and some of its negative 
charaCleristics. For a society that aspires to democracy and development 
(he important question is: would Dicey have recommended legislative 
sovereignty for the typical post-colonial African state? 
The obvious answer is no. It is very unlikely that Dicey would have rec-
ommended the English political system for the typical African state. As 
has been argued, Dicey believed that English people were inherently 
democratic and in the long run the legislature would only enact laws that 
conform to the values of the majority of English people. The typical Afri-
can SLate is extremely authoritarian. Wide discretion and arbitrariness 
have characterised the use of power in the modern African state and these 
have been at the expense of the development of legality. A constitutional 
system based on legislative sovereignty without democratic values would 
be very different from Dicey's ideal constitutional arrangement. 
4.2 LIT, the tyrant's charter and political development 
The doctrine of legitimacy and LIT that is propounded by Azu Crabbe JSC 
in (;fAO v laeea and Assibey III v Ayisi and by Archer JA in Armah v Naawu 
is really a doctrine of legislative supremacy without the necessary demo-
cratic values to control legislative supremacy. What will be the conse· 
quences, if we adopt such a theory for our political system? It will be a 
tyranL's charter. A political system LhaL legitimises any laws enaCled by 
the legislature will provide solace to tyrants. They will find comfort in a 
legal system that is prepared to enforce any laws that they pass, irrespec-
rive of their moral content. 
Citizens of African states are, however, not likely to accept laws JUSt 
because a legislature has enacted them. They will resist Lyrannical laws 
because such laws are inimical to Africa's development. Such resistance 
will increase poliLical instability and affect the development of African 
societies. 
4.3 Law, legitimacy and the African state 
What should be the law's contribution to the political system of the Gha-
naian state in particular and the African state in general? The law should 
provide the formal and substantive rules of political accountability that 
would ensure legitimacy for our political system, It is my view that the law 
in Ghana already has the resources upon which we can develop the ap-
propriate principles of political accountability and make our politics more 
legitimate. These principles can be found In the value-based theory of 
interpretaLion. 
5 A LIBERAL'S STORY 
What are the substantive political values that can provide legitimacy to the 










































LEGITIMACY AND INTERPRETATION IN GHANAIAN LAW 
which the principles of political accountability can be constructed for the 
Ghanaian political system, and indeed for all African states. It provides the 
only account of legitimacy that is appropriate to the people of Africa. 
Liberalism as a political theory is a protest against restriclions on the 
self-determined actions of the individual. African liberalism therefore has 
two primary objectives. It aims to remove the arbitrary state and to 
replace it with one based on rules embedded in liberal democratic values. 
Liberalism also calls for substantive democracy in which all people. irre-
spective of their ethniC, cultural or religious backgrounds, participate in 
polities through fair elecrions and take pan in debates about the policies 
that affect their lives. Liberalism therefore calls for reasonable and rational 
governance. Governance must be reasonable because government must 
have a moral basis_ Rational government is also necessary because there 
must be an efficient and effective relationship between the ends of gov-
ernment and the means that government uses to attain those ends. We 
argue that the basic liberties of the citizen cannm be interfered with 
except to expand liberty. Thus the right to free speech, freedom or con-
science. and the right to participate in government, freedom of associa-
tion and freedom from arbitrary arrest are individual rights that cannot be 
interfered with by the state. The right to own property that has been 
legally acquired is also a basic righ£. Any attempt to interfere with those 
rights provides the basis for a justified rebellion. 
5.1 Liberalism and interpretation 
A liberal political arrangement is obviously incompatible with legislative 
sovereignty. Consequently. in a liberal society. LIT has to be rejected if a 
literal interpretation of a statute or the constitution has the consequence 
of unjustifiably interfering with the basic liberties of citizens. 
5.2 Liberalism: The formal dimension 
it has been pOinted out that Sowah JA in CFAO v Zacca and Amissah JA in 
Armah v Naawu decided those cases on the basis of values such as equal-
ity, justice, fairness and integrity. These values have a formal dimension. 
For example, fairness as a formal concept will require that aJi like cases 
should be treated alike. Stated this way, the concept of fairness does not 
go far enough to protect substantive liberal values. For it is possible for a 
law to be enacted which states that "all blue-eyed children should be 
murdered·' As long as all blue-eyed children are murdered the law has 
satisfied the condition of formal fairness. 
However, even formal political values can radically reduce the power of 
the arbitrary state. These values will control the unrestricted discretion 
available to the African state, which allows it to engage in discriminatory 
treatment of its citizens. for example, a tyrant forced to adhere to formal 
fairness will have to ensure that none of his relations or his supporters is 
blue-eyed before he can go ahead with the murder of all blue-eyed chilo 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
5.3 Legitimacy and development 
One of the major aspirations of a developing country like Ghana is to 
develop irs political and economic systems so that there is prosperity for 
its citizens. Our analysis of legitimacy should, therefore, indicate the 
contribution that legitimacy can bring to the development process. 
At this point, a recapitulation of Beetham's argument is in order. Ac-
cording to him legitimacy is important because man has a capacity for a 
moral sense, and power that is illegitimate offends our moral senses.c~ 
Legitimacy provides the moral grounds for co-operation between different 
sections of SOCiety. Legitimate power therefore has the right to expect 
obedience" and people obey legitimate authoritx because. as moral 
agents, they recognise the validity of such authority.-7 
Legitimacy is therefore of extreme importance in a political system. It is 
Significant not only for the maintenance of order, but also for the degree 
of co-operation and the quality of performance that leaders can secure 
from their citizens. :'8 A system which is legitimate is orderly, stable and 
effeci ive; it is orderly because there is a solid level of support from the 
populace, which allows the system to withstand shock; it is effective 
because the leaders are able to achieve their purposes because of the 
quality of performance they can secure from subordinates. Legitimacy is 
not the only source of such values, but it provides a crucial contribution to 
these qualities through its effect on citizens as moral agents and not 
merely as self-interested actors. 
Many pearle think erroneously that the fundamental problem facing 
African Slates is lheir weak economies. Nothing is further from the truth. 
The major predicament of many African states is the crises of legitimacy 
of African political systems, which encourages rebellions and political 
instability. Until this crisis is dealt with, Africa's economic problems can 
never be resolved. Many citizens consider their governments to be ille-
gitimate because they are unjust. illegal and arbitrary. Consequently. the 
states are disorderly, unstable and ineffective. In such situations, African 
leaders cannO( secure the co-operation of (he majority of their citizens. 
Until governments become legitimate there can never be the bedrock of 
solid support from their citizenry that will allow governments to take the 
tough measures that need [Q be taken to propel African countries and 
societies forward. 
5.3 Legitimacy and Ghana's 1992 Constitution 
It is possihle to criticise this paper by arguing that its whole thrust is 
misguided. After all, the 1992 Ghana Constitution of Ghana captures many 
of the liberal ideals that have been argued for here. Chapter 5 of the 1992 
2::' [leellldlli 1991 
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LEGlTIMACY AND INTERPRETATION IN GHANAIAN LAW 
Constitution protects fundamental freedoms and it is unlikely that the 
courts will interpret statutes according to LIT or in ways that will weaken 
the protection given to fundamental freedoms in the Constitution. 
There are two responses that can be made to this criticism. First, the 
criticism is based on unjustified optimism. It is important to rernember 
Dicey's warning that constitutions and piOUS proclamations do not protect 
civil liberties. Taking Ghana's history into consideration, it will be unwise 
to believe (hat the 1992 Constitution alone can protect our liberties. 
Ghana's democratic experiment can be overthrown and history provides 
ample evidence of the return to the dark days of tyranny when this oc-
curs. Thus a sustained inculcation of liberal values into Ghana's political 
system is the surest way of preventing the abuse of basic liberties that 
Ghana has witnessed in its years as an independent state. More omi-
nously, there is evidence that suggests that even in this new democratic 
dISpensation, it has been difficult to wean judges from LIT Unfortunately 
some judges continue to commit the legalistiC Fallacy. 
Second, the criticism is misconceived because it rails to recognise the 
proper relationship that exists between constitutions and what legitimises 
constitutions. It is not the 1992 ConstilUtion that has legitimised liberalism 
within the Ghanaian political system. Rather, it is the liberal foundations 
of the 1992 Constitution that have given legitimacy to the Constilution. 
Liberal values are the rundamental values upon which the ConstilUtion 
and all the other laws of Ghana have to be Judged. Any system of gov-
ernment, constitutional or unconstitutional, must be judged by the extent 
to which it achieves the liberal ideal. The 1992 Constitution is an impor-
tant document, but it is important only because it meets citizens' aspira-
tions i-ind protects their Hbenies. The moment the Constitution ceases to 
protect liberal values, it becomes illegitimate and must face the full resis-
tance of Ihe people 
5A The role of the courts in the administration of Ghana 
The role that the courts should play in the administration of the country is 
a question that arises whenever there is an attempt to democratise polities 
in Ghana in particular and in Africa in general. Many people will argue 
that the role of the courts is to interpret and enforce the law according to 
the Constitution. It should be clear from this paper that the courts have a 
more rundamental role to pay in the administration of the country. First, 
the courts must support legitimate governments and these must be gov-
ernments that subscribe to the liberal ideal. Second, the courts should 
interpret the law to protect and promote the basic values of liberalism 
rather (han (0 give succour to the arbitrary state. They must ensure that 
laws are interpreted in ways that make government accountable to the 
people. When they interpret statutes and constitutions in these ways, they 
will be providing the legitimacy [hat our polilical systems so badly need. 
They will be assisting in creating the stability, orderliness and effeclive-
ness of the state that is essential to the development process The law will 
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6 CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have argued that liberal political theory provides the basis 
of legitimacy for Ghana and for African governments. We have also ar~ 
gued that the courts must engage in interpretation with the object of 
protecting and promoting liberal values. These are the lines along which 
vJlue-based interpretation must develop. We have argued funher that 
constitutions are not by themselves legitimate. It is the liberalism of the 
1992 Constitution that has legitimised the 1992 Constitution, 
The struggle for liberalism in Africa has a long history. The struggle is 
bound to intensify because the new African aspires towards political, 
economic and social progress Some people have argued that with the 
defeat of communism we are at the end of history. It is obvious that in 
Africa the struggle against arbitrary government has Just begun in earnest. 
In Africa, we are at the beginning of history. 
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